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On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Fordham
Intellectual Property Law & Policy Conference, its organizer,
Professor Hugh Hansen, planned a session on “U.S. Copyright
Law: Where Has It Been? Where Is It Going?” and asked me to
look back over the twenty years since the conference’s inception in
order to identify the most important development in copyright
during that period. Of course, the obvious answer is “the
Internet,” or “digital media,” whose effect on copyright law has
been pervasive. I want to propose a less obvious response, but
first acknowledge that digital media and communications have
presented significant challenges to every one of the exclusive
rights that § 106 of the Copyright Act grants to authors. Part I
will summarize those challenges, as well as the addition of a new §
106 right, and of new “paracopyright”1 rights regarding
technological protection measures and copyright management
information. Digital media have also considerably broadened the
scope of fair use and have prompted the introduction of
commercially significant immunities for intermediary service
providers. Part II will address the expansion of copyright defenses
and immunities and will suggest that, contrary to the popular
depiction of overreaching copyright rights and remedies, the
courts have re-balanced copyright to weight toward users.
Finally, turning from digital media, I will offer a less obvious
response, one that I hope evokes the core of copyright law, past,
present and future.

1
See, e.g., David Nimmer, Puzzles of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 46 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 401, 405 (1998).
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I. EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS, MODIFIED BY DIGITAL MEDIA?
A. Section 106 rights
Over the last twenty years, the growth of digital media has
obliged courts to reconsider the basic statutory concepts of
fixation, transfer, reproduction and public performance and
display. The perils, and promise, of digital exploitations have also
prompted Congress to create a new exclusive right, to control
access to works of authorship through imposition of technological
protection measures.
1. Right to reproduce the work in copies
With respect to the first of the § 106 rights, the exclusive right
to reproduce the work in copies, case law has addressed the basic
issues of “what is a copy?” and “who makes the copy?”2 The first
question concerns the vexed issue of “RAM copying”—is the
temporary digital copy of a program that resides on a computer’s
random access memory considered “fixed,” even though the copy
remains more or less briefly in the RAM and is lost when the
computer is shut down? Is there a difference between a copy
temporarily resident in RAM (which could remain there for days
until the user turns the computer off), and a copy transiting through
a computer network? Both types of a copy appear to meet the
statutory prerequisite of capacity to be “perceived, reproduced or
otherwise communicated . . . with the aid of a machine or device.”3
But the statute also requires that this capacity endure for “a period
of more than transitory duration.”4 The 1976 House Report states
that “transient reproductions . . . captured momentarily in the
‘memory’ of a computer’ should not be deemed fixed.”5 It is not
clear how fleeting Congress expected a “transient reproduction” to
be.
The subsequent report of the congressionally created
2

Compare Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121
(2d Cir. 2008) (holding cable company was not directly liable under the Copyright Act
because copies were “made” by its customers), with MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer,
Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding copying under copyright law includes transfer
from permanent storage device to a computer’s RAM).
3
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
4
Id. § 101.
5
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666.
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Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU) led to a 1980 amendment of § 117 of the Copyright Act
exempting a temporary reproduction of a computer program that is
made simply by turning on the computer (§ 117(a)(1)) and a
further amendment of that section in 1998 to the same effect (§
117(c)).6 This legislation appears to adopt the principle, expressed
in the CONTU report, that entry of a work into the memory of a
computer makes a “copy” of the work, apparently without
distinction as to the duration of the copy.7 Congress’s provision of
narrow exemptions for RAM copying in § 117 of the Copyright
Act points toward a congressional understanding that such copying
would otherwise be infringing under § 106.8
But neither CONTU nor the § 117 amendments explicitly
addressed especially evanescent reproductions in transit from one
computer to another. Is there a point at which a reproduction is too
fleeting to be a “copy” within the scope of the exclusive right of
reproduction? The Second Circuit, in Cartoon Network v. CSC
Holdings,9 emphasizing what it called the “duration requirement”
in the definition of “fixed,” held that reproductions made in a
computer’s “buffer” and lasting 1.2 seconds, were insufficiently
“fixed” to be “copies.” The ruling may be in some tension with
decisions from other circuits and a study by the Copyright Office
interpreting the reproduction right to encompass a broad temporal
range of “RAM copies.”10 The court distinguished the case law
6

These amendments accorded exemptions for such copying when unauthorized if for
the expected use of purchased programs or in connection with the “maintenance or
repair” of the computer. Section 117(c) responds to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in MAI
Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d 511, which had found a repair service’s creation of a temporary
copy to infringe.
7
See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, FINAL REPORT 22 (1978).
8
But see R. Anthony Reese, The Public Display Right: The Copyright Act’s
Neglected Solution to the Controversy Over RAM “Copies,” 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 145
(2001) (contending that applying reproduction analysis to RAM copying disputes creates
an overbroad “RAM copy doctrine” that “may allow a copyright owner not only to use
copyright to control activities by third parties . . . that would not otherwise infringe, but . .
. may allow copyright owners . . . to control other people’s access to, and use of,
noncopyrightable elements contained in a copyrighted work”).
9
536 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2008).
10
See, e.g., Stenograph LLC v. Bossard Assocs., 144 F.3d 96, 101–02 (D.C. Cir.
1998); MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d 511; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104
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authorities for failure to explicitly address the duration
requirement. It also criticized the Copyright Office Report, which
had confronted the duration issue, but had reached a different
conclusion: “According to the Copyright Office, if the work is
capable of being copied from that medium for any amount of time,
the answer to both questions [embodiment and duration] is ‘yes.’
The problem with this interpretation is that it reads the ‘transitory
duration’ language out of the statute.”11 Inquiring, therefore,
“[d]oes any such embodiment [in Cablevision’s buffer] last ‘for a
period of more than transitory duration’?” the court answered no.12
While ruling that 1.2 seconds were not “more than transitory,” the
court did not indicate what period of embodiment would suffice,
although it did imply that “at least several minutes” would meet
the duration requirement.13 Nor did the court suggest how to
characterize durations falling between those two limits.14
As for who makes the copy, the Second Circuit, imposing a
controversial “volition” condition, ruled that the entrepreneur of an
automated system that copies, stores, and plays back television
programming to subscribers at the subscribers’ demand, did not
“make” those copies because the system simply responded to the
end-user’s choice of programming to copy. It is not clear,

REPORT 107–23 (2001) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT], available at
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf.
Of these
authorities, however, only the Copyright Office Report specifically addresses
reproductions as transient as “buffer copies.” The Ninth and D.C. Circuit decisions
involved software loaded into RAM and apparently retained for some minutes. But see
MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 938–39 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding
as licensees, not owners, of game software, players may infringe when their computers
temporarily copy software into RAM).
11
Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 129.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 128.
14
Id.; see also License for Making and Distributing Phonorecords, Including Digital
Phonorecord Deliveries, 73 Fed. Reg. 66,173, 66,177 (proposed Nov. 7, 2008) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201 and 255) (“The [Cablevision] court’s reasoning leaves at
least something to be desired and offers no guidance as to when a copy might be
considered to be ‘embodied’ for ‘a period of more than transitory duration.’ . . . Indeed, it
leaves open the possibility that a buffer copy that exists for several seconds might have
sufficient duration to satisfy the fixation requirement. We can glean no principle from
the Second Circuit’s opinion which offers any guidance as to where the line is to be
drawn.”).
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however, that volition must always be a distinct element of the
violation of the reproduction right. The court’s principal authority
for a volition requirement, Religious Technology Center v. Netcom
On-Line Communications Services,15 a Northern District of
California decision from the first years of the twenty-year period
here surveyed, concerned a “mere conduit” online service provider,
who simply conveyed copies of works from one subscriber to
another.16 By contrast, Cablevision’s own transmissions were the
source of the copies the subscribers requested. Moreover, while
Cablevision did not select the particular program designated by the
user, the user made her selection from a universe proposed by
Cablevision, and Cablevision stored the selected programs.
One suspects that underlying the court’s determination that
Cablevision did not “make” the copies it stored for users at their
request, was an unstated conclusion regarding an issue the parties
agreed not to litigate: whether the end users would be liable for
copying the television programming. The court seems to have
considered the subscribers’ activities as a higher-tech form of
“time shifting;” under the Supreme Court’s Sony decision,17 time
shifting (at least of free broadcast television)18 is non-infringing,
thus the higher-tech version must be non-infringing, too. That
calculus may have informed the court’s assessment of “who” made
the copy. Suppose instead, however, that Cablevision had been
offering its customers access to programming that the customers
were not otherwise entitled to view, for example because those
customers formed an audience to which Cablevision’s cable or
satellite distribution compulsory license did not extend.19 One may
15

907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
Congress in 1998 codified much of the Netcom results with respect to online service
providers in § 512 of the Copyright Act.
17
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454–55 (1984).
18
Cablevision customers were time shifting cable transmissions, which fall outside the
stated scope of Sony.
19
See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 111, 119, 122 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). Sections 111 and 119
differentiate between local broadcasts and distant broadcasts. Local broadcasts are those
that can reach viewers in the area where the cable system or satellite is located without
the use of a cable system or satellite, and distant broadcasts are those that viewers would
not otherwise receive without the cable system or satellite because they are imported
from distant broadcast stations. Cable systems or satellites can retransmit local
broadcasts without having to pay copyright license fees, but §§ 111 and 119 establish a
16
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wonder whether, in this version, the court still would have found
that Cablevision lacked sufficient agency to be the “maker” of
those storage copies.
The court may have assumed that it ultimately will not matter
who “makes” the copy if the business that “induced” the end-user
to make the copy would in any event be liable as a contributory
infringer20 (an issue the parties agreed not to litigate). But if the
end-user’s copy is not infringing, there will be no secondary
liability. Arguably, if the end-user’s copying would be fair use,
then assisting that copying should not be infringing either, whether
the assistance comes in the form of enabling the end-user to do the
copying herself, or instead doing the copying for the user. But the
case law is far from clear that copying on behalf of the user is fair
use.21 Given the proliferation of increasingly automated “on
demand” services, to designate as the de jure “copyist” the
beneficiary of the copy that the service offered to make on the
user’s behalf risks putting significant amounts of economic activity
beyond the reach of the copyright law (and spawning new business
models designed to exploit this newly-introduced gap in the law).22
compulsory license scheme for distant broadcasts. Section 119 defines the households
and subscribers eligible to receive secondary transmissions from the satellite carrier, and
sets out “violation[s] of territorial restrictions on statutory license for network stations.”
Section 122 allows a satellite carrier to make secondary transmissions into the television
station’s local market, subject to a compulsory license. Pursuant to § 122(f), the satellite
carrier may not transmit the performance or display to a subscriber who does not reside in
the originating television station’s local market.
20
See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 923,
937–40 (2005) (finding that the users of defendants’ file-sharing software downloaded
copyright files, but defendants were liable for contributory infringement because they
induced infringement); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014, 1022
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that Napster’s users violated plaintiffs’ right of reproduction, but
Napster was liable as a contributory infringer because it supplied the means of copying
and had specific knowledge of what works were being copied).
21
See generally Joseph P. Liu, Enabling Copyright Consumers, 22 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1099, 1099–1100 (2007) (“[C]ourts quite frequently hold companies liable for
helping consumers engage in activities that would be fair or non-infringing uses if
undertaken by consumers themselves.”).
22
See, e.g., Disney Enters., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (S.D. Fla.
2011) (dismissing count of direct copyright infringement by file-sharing service for
failure to plead volitional conduct); Fox Broadcasting Co. v. Dish Network LLC, 2012
US Dist LEXIS 169112 (C.D. Cal. 2012). Other courts have not found the Second
Circuit’s volition prerequisite persuasive. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. WTV
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2. Derivative works right
The meaning of “derivative works” covered by § 106(2) came
into question in cases testing the scope of the definition “any form
in which the work may be recast, transformed or adapted.” Is a
complementary product, designed to intervene in the experience of
watching a movie or playing a videogame, for example by altering
the game’s speed, or by deleting salacious scenes from the film, a
“derivative work” if the product does not memorialize the changes
in some fixed form? Case law is unclear,23 and Congress in the
Family Movie Act of 200524 provided a specific exemption for
wholesome-izing software, while avoiding a determination of
whether that software’s sanitized output would have been a
“derivative work.”
3. Distribution right
The third exclusive right under § 106, to distribute copies of
the work “to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or
by rental, lease or lending” has given rise to several inquiries in the
digital context. First, does “by sale or other transfer of ownership”
limit the kinds of distribution that come within the scope of the
right, so that the right covers only transfer of physical copies?
Because one who sends a digital file retains ownership of her
source copy, if “transfer of ownership” implies divestiture, then
only hardcopy formats are susceptible to such transfers. A transfer
of ownership of an analog copy implicitly involves the transferor’s
divestiture of her copy so that the transferee may take possession.
A book sold by a bookstore leaves the store with the customer;
there is one fewer copy in the store’s inventory. With digital

Sys., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1011 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Fox Television Stations Inc. v.
BarryDriller Content System PC, 2012 US Dist LEXIS 184209 (C.D. Cal. 2012). For
more detailed criticism of Cartoon Network v. Cablevision, see Jane C. Ginsburg, Recent
Developments in U.S. Copyright—Part II, Caselaw: Exclusive Rights on the Ebb?, 218
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 167 (January 2009), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/columbia/pllt/papers/ 08158.
23
Compare Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998),
with Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir.
1992).
24
Family Movie Act of 2005, 17 U.S.C. § 110(11) (2006) (exempting certain
bowdlerizing technologies).
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copies, by contrast, one typically “sends” a copy, but retains one’s
“original” or “own” copy in one’s computer memory. There is no
divestiture; rather at least two people now own copies where
before there was only one owner. Under these circumstances, is
there a “transfer of ownership”?
In London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe,25 the district court
focused on the creation of a new copy in the computer of the
recipient, a copy which the recipient now owns: “What matters in
the marketplace is not whether a material object ‘changes hands,’
but whether, when the transaction is completed, the distributee has
a material object.”26 The concept of “transfer” in the digital world
does not imply the disappearance of the transferor’s copy, yet the
term appears as a matter of course. For example the phrase “file
transfer” (as in “file transfer protocol” or “FTP”) is widely used to
denote sending a digital file without necessarily (or ever) deleting
the file from the sender’s computer.27 Moreover, on further
examination, a “distribution” need not always result in a loss of
possession, even in the analog world. For one very old
technological example, consider the biblical loaves and fishes.
English versions of the gospels recount that Jesus ordered his
disciples to “distribute” the loaves and fishes to the public.
Though the supply seemed inadequate, all the public were served,
yet at the end, the same number of loaves and fishes remained in
the baskets as at the outset.28

25

542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008).
Id. at 175. Taken out of context, the court’s end-up-with-a-copy test could be
overbroad. For example, if a home viewer records a television broadcast, thus creating a
copy, has the broadcaster “distributed” the “copy” the viewer ended up with? Indeed,
with contemporary recording media, any performance or display could result in “copies,”
though, as a matter of common sense, it is doubtful that many of them would constitute
“distributions.” For example, if passers-by photograph the wearer of a t-shirt emblazoned
with copyrightable text or image, copies will result, but the wearer cannot reasonably be
said to have distributed them. For a distribution to take place, the exchange (or new
creation) of a copy should be the object of the transaction.
27
Other common uses of “transfer” that do not imply divestiture include Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP), and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). See Margaret
Rouse, What Is File Transfer Protocol?, SEARCHENTERPRISEWAN.COM (Apr. 2007),
http://searchenterprisewan.techtarget.com/definition/File-Transfer-Protocol.
28
John 6:11 (King James). For another bread-related example of a distribution which
does not require the donor to part with her possession, a baker can parcel out to other
26
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Legislation enacted during our twenty-year review period
endorses the characterization of a transfer of a digital file as a form
of “distribution.”
In 1995, Congress amended the § 115
“compulsory license for making and distributing phonorecords” to
include among the beneficiaries of the license “those who make
phonorecords or digital phonorecord deliveries,” and further
specifying, “[a] person may obtain a compulsory license only if his
or her primary purpose in making phonorecords is to distribute
them to the public for private use, including by means of a digital
phonorecord delivery.”29 The definition of “digital phonorecord
delivery” confirms that the constitution of the copy in the
recipient’s computer is the key activity: “A ‘digital phonorecord
delivery’ is each individual delivery of a phonorecord by digital
transmission of a sound recording which results in a specifically
identifiable reproduction by or for any transmission recipient of a
phonorecord of that sound recording . . . .”30 It is reasonable to
assume that by 1995 Congress was aware that digital deliveries
create new copies without divesting the sender’s copy; if Congress
nonetheless equated “digital phonorecord delivery” with
distribution, then “transfer of ownership” cannot, at least with
respect to the distribution rights in musical works and sound
recordings, have been understood to require dispossession of the
transferor’s copy.31
But other problems remain, particularly concerning the
compliance of the U.S. with the internationally-mandated “making
available right.”32 The U.S. ratified the 1996 WIPO Treaties
without providing explicitly for a “making available” right because
it took the position that current U.S. law covered the substance of
the right through a combination of the distribution and public

bakers batches of sourdough “starter” yet retain an amount sufficient to prepare her own
loaves.
29
17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2006), amended by Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336.
30
17 U.S.C. § 115(d) (2006) (emphasis added).
31
See S. REP. NO. 104-128 at 17 (1995) (legislative history of 1995 Act, adverting to
uncertainty whether a “transmission can constitute a distribution of copies” and
“express[ing] no [general] view on current law in this regard” but wanting to remove
uncertainty “as to digital transmissions of recorded music”).
32
See WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 6, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17.
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performance rights.33 Some U.S. courts have nonetheless held that
merely offering a file via a website or filesharing network does not
“distribute” the work because “distribution” requires actual
receipt.34 So far the case law, all from district courts, has provided
inconsistent responses. While early decisions generally considered
(without extended analysis) that making a work available for enduser access and copying “distributed” copies of the work,35 later
rulings are more tormented. Some require a showing of actual
receipt, but disagree whether the court may presume receipt if the
making available has set in motion all the other elements of
distribution.36 At least one other court, emphasizing the definition
of “publication,” which covers both distribution of copies and the
offering to distribute copies, has concluded that making copies
available for download is akin to offering to distribute, which
constitutes a “publication,” which is synonymous with
distribution.37 Although Congress in 2005 amended the criminal
provisions of the Copyright Act to cover “the distribution of a
work being prepared for commercial distribution, by making it
available on a computer network accessible to members of the

33

See, e.g., MIHÁLY FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET 502–04
(2002).
34
See Capitol Records v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1218–19 (D. Minn. 2008).
Contra Elektra Entm’t Grp. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234, 241–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(equating distribution with publication and holding that an offer is sufficient).
35
See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex.
1997); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
36
Compare London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 169 (D. Mass.
2008) (holding that “a reasonable fact-finder may infer that the distribution actually took
place”) with Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1218–19 (D. Minn.
2008) (holding that “actual dissemination” is required).
37
See Elektra, 551 F. Supp. 2d at 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). For an extensive discussion of
the distribution right and its application to digital media, see Peter S. Menell, In Search of
Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet Age, 59 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1 (2012).
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public,”38 courts have yet to interpret this amendment as a general
equation of the distribution and making available rights.39
4. Right to perform the work “publicly”
Difficulties proliferate in connection with the fourth § 106
right, to perform the work publicly. First, while the hardcopy
world warranted the traditional distinction between copying and
distribution on the one hand, and public performance on the other,
digital media blurs the boundary, leaving courts to determine when
an online exploitation is a distribution of copies and when it is a
public performance. When new modes of exploitation challenge
the familiar order, courts and litigants grope toward the most apt
metaphor.
Hence, when ASCAP contended that sending
downloadable ringtones and music files should be deemed public
performances, the court characterized the download as the digital
equivalent of buying a disc at a record store, and streaming as the
Internet equivalent of the radio.40 While streaming would come
within the ambit of a public performance license, if a download is
like buying a record and taking it home to listen to, then only
private performances would ensue from the download.41 The court
acknowledged that there might be exploitations occupying a
midpoint on the spectrum between streams and downloads, but
determined that it need not yet ascertain their correct
characterization.42
Even were the act deemed a “performance,” to trigger § 106(4),
it must also be “public.” Where only one member of the public
receives a transmission of a performance, the transmission’s
characterization as a public pay-per-view or a private performance

38

Artists’ Rights and Theft Prevention Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218,
220 (amending § 506(a) to criminalize “the distribution of a work being prepared for
commercial distribution, by making it available on a computer network accessible to
members of the public, if such person knew or should have known that the work was
intended for commercial distribution”).
39
For a fuller discussion of the making available right, see David Carson, Making the
“Making Available” Right Available, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 135 (2010).
40
See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 627 F.3d 64,
74 (2d Cir. 2010).
41
See id. at 73; see also In re Cellco P’ship, 663 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
42
Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 627 F.3d at 75 n.10.
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may, according to the Second Circuit, turn on whether a
centralized source copy generates multiple transmissions to
members of the public, or whether only one member of the public
can receive a transmission from a single, dedicated source copy.43
As the cost of digital storage drops, the prospects for redundant
individually-dedicated copies increase, potentially spawning a host
of new copyright-avoiding business models, particularly as that
storage moves to the “cloud.”44
5. Right of public display
The § 106(5) right of public display encounters many of the
same ambiguities as the public performance right, as well as an
additional uncertainty regarding “who” engages in an online public
display. The Ninth Circuit has ruled that the “display” of a digital
image emanates from the source website, even when an
intermediary frames the image in a way that, to the viewer, appears
to make the framer (whose advertisements also accompany the
third-party image) the source of the display.45
6. Digital public performance of sound recordings
Finally, in this review of the impact of digital media on the
exclusive rights under copyright, Congress in 1995 and again in
1998 established a new right, of digital public performance of
sound recordings. The new § 106(6) regime confers a full
exclusive right on interactive communications (such as listen on
demand), and imposes a compulsory license for webcasting and
other non-interactive services. The compulsory license mandates a
50-50 division of royalties between producers and performers

43

Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 135 (2d Cir. 2008).
Other courts have not found the Second Circuit’s volition prerequisite persuasive. See,
e.g., Fox Television Stations v. Barrydriller Content Sys., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184209
(C.D. Cal. 2012) (finding public performance and taking issue with Cartoon Network);
Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. WTV Sys., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1011 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
44
See, e.g., Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, 874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(following Cablevision, no infringement found because retransmission of over-the-air
television broadcast signals not a public performance as signals are first copied and
stored for individual users and each user receives transmission from her individualized
copy).
45
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1175 (9th Cir. 2007).
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(with 5% of the performers’ share set aside for “non featured”
performers). By contrast, if the full exclusive right applies,
performers will be remunerated according to their contracts, which
may mean that they will not in fact be compensated.46 This
division of spoils inspires a heretical inquiry: if creators are
guaranteed a share of the income from a compulsory license, but
may well get nothing from the market rate right, might they be
better off without exclusive rights in exchange for guaranteed
remuneration?
B. DMCA—Strengthening the hand of copyright holders?
In addition to their impact on the interpretation of traditional
exclusive rights set out in § 106 of the Copyright Act, digital
media have spawned new copyright-reinforcing rights, sometimes
referred to as “paracopyright.”47 Given the speed with which the
Internet can be used both to reproduce near-perfect copies and
phonorecords and to transmit them around the world, Congress
concluded it was important to support the efforts of copyright
owners to prevent infringement at the outset, rather than merely to
seek judicial relief afterward.48 Of course, digital dissemination of
copyrighted works also poses opportunities, notably in reducing
the costs of producing hardcopies and distributing them through
“bricks and mortar” stores.
Congress perceived that the
development of a digital marketplace would require building
copyright owner confidence that digital dissemination would not
result in rampant unauthorized redistribution.49 Further, a digital
marketplace would give rise to new business models for
individualized on-demand delivery of copyrighted works.
Accordingly, Congress adopted the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA) in 1998.50 Its purpose, in § 1201, is to promote
lawful digital dissemination by ensuring that “technological
protection measures” that copyright owners choose to apply to
their works—such as scrambling or encrypting digital versions of

46
47
48
49
50

See 17 U.S.C. § 114(g) (2006).
See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 5.
See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998); H.R. REP NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21–23 (1998).
See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998); H.R. REP NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 23 (1998).
Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
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recordings, films and books—are not circumvented without proper
authorization.
Such technological protection measures are
intended to prevent usable copies of the copyright-protected work
from being copied, stored or transmitted to others. They also seek
to safeguard the new access-based business models.51
1. Paracopyright—Anticircumvention controls
Section 1201(a) provides that “no person shall circumvent a
technological protection measure that effectively controls access to
a work” protected by copyright, and that “no person shall
manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or
part thereof” that (among other things) is “primarily designed or
produced” for the purpose of circumvention or is knowingly
marketed for use in circumvention. While § 1201(a) thus forbids
circumvention of what is known as “access-protection”
technology, § 1201(b) imposes comparable proscriptions upon
“copy-protection” technology. Violations of § 1201 are not
technically
infringements
of
copyright,52
hence
the
“paracopyright” sobriquet, but §§ 1203 and 1204 impose civil and
criminal liability, respectively, much like that for copyright
infringement.
Case law has focused on two threshold issues: what are the
works whose access controls § 1201(a) protects;53 and is the right
to control “access” in effect a right independent of the § 106
exclusive rights?54 That is, must there be a nexus between access
to the work and exercise of an exclusive right under copyright, or
does a protected access control also cover forms of exploitation or
enjoyment of copyrighted works, such as private performances, to
which § 106 does not extend?

51

See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 1–2 (1998).
Nor is registration of copyright in the technologically-protected work a prerequisite
to an anti-circumvention claim. See I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Berkshire Info.
Sys., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 521, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
53
See infra text accompanying notes 55–62.
54
See infra text accompanying notes 63–69.
52
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a) Subject matter protected
In notorious but, happily, unsuccessful attempts to leverage the
DMCA into protecting the “aftermarket” for spare and replacement
parts, the producers of printers and cartridges, in one case,55 and of
garage door openers, in the other,56 asserted that rival printer
cartridge and door opener manufacturers had violated the DMCA’s
prohibition on circumvention of access controls. In both cases, the
spare part in question would not interact with the host device
unless the host device recognized the spare part as authorized to
function together with the host device. If the spare part entered the
appropriate authentication sequence or, in the terms of a
frequently-used metaphor, engaged in the “secret handshake” with
the host device, then the host would be “fooled” into “thinking”
that it was working with a component made by the same producer
and would allow the component to perform its intended function.57
The “secret handshake” thus made it possible for a rival printer
cartridge to substitute for the printer producer’s own replacement
cartridges, and for a “universal garage door opener” to open the
remote controlled garage doors manufactured by a rival company.
Since neither printer cartridges nor garage doors are
copyrighted works, one might query the basis on which § 1201
could have applied. The plaintiffs emphasized that computer
programs control the functioning of these devices, and computer
programs are copyrighted works.58 The extraordinary consequence
of the plaintiffs’ reasoning would have been that any useful object
whose workings are controlled by computer programs can come
within the scope of § 1201 if the object’s producer makes access to
those programs subject to an authentication sequence. As a policy
matter, this result is inconceivable. Among other things, Congress
has persistently declined to legislate design protection, in part
because of its inability to resolve the spare parts issue;59 Congress

55

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Controls Corp., 387 F.3d 522, 547 (6th Cir. 2004).
Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1183 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
57
See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 530.
58
See id. at 546; Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1186.
59
The closest Congress has come is setting out a sui generis regime limited to the
production of boat hull designs. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1302 (2006).
56
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is unlikely to have sought the result of an exceptionally strong
design protection regime through the stealthy means of the DMCA.
Policy aside, the text of § 1201 does not require protecting
against the circumvention of the authentication sequence that
controls access to the copyrightable computer program that
controls the functioning of the consumer product. The Lexmark
court reviewed earlier “secret handshake” cases, involving access
to transmissions of recordings of musical works, to videogames
and to motion pictures on DVDs.60 The court underscored that all
of those cases involved circumvention of access to computer
programs that were “conduit[s] to protectable expression.”61 In the
printer cartridge case, by contrast, operating the computer program
did not make it possible to see, hear or otherwise engage with a
work of authorship. Rather, “the program’s output is purely
functional: [it] ‘controls a number of operations’ in the Lexmark
printer.”62
b) Nature of the access that the measure controls
If the technological protection measure must control access to a
non-functional copyrighted work, does the access also have to be
related to the exercise of rights under copyright? The court in the
Chamberlain v. Skylink garage door opener controversy also
declined to protect the authentication sequence against
circumvention, but arrived at that result by addressing the purpose
of the access that the technological measure controls.63 The court
interpolated into § 1201 a requirement that the protection against
circumvention of an access control be related to protection against
infringement.64 In the court’s analysis, to the extent that an access
control forestalls infringement, for example, by making
unauthorized copies unplayable and therefore futile, the access
control comes within the scope of § 1201. But the court

60

See, e.g., RealNetworks v. Streambox, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *20–21
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000) (one of the first decisions to find violations of technological
protection measures, in this case both access and copy controls).
61
Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 547–48.
62
Id. at 548.
63
381 F.3d at 1204.
64
Id.
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determined that if the uses that the access control cuts off are not
infringing uses, then the access control is not one that § 1201 was
designed to protect.65 While this distinction makes some sense in
the case of garage door openers, as applied to access controls that
are “conduits” to works of authorship, the proposition is in some
tension with Congress’s goals in prohibiting the circumvention of
those technological measures. The Chamberlain court worried that
interpreting § 1201 to create an independent violation for
circumventing access controls (or disseminating access
circumvention devices) would “effectively create two distinct
copyright regimes,” one tied to the traditional rights of copyright
owners (§ 1201(b)), and the other allowing copyright owners
“unlimited rights to hold circumventors liable under § 1201(a)
merely for accessing that work, even if that access enabled only
rights that the Copyright Act grants to the public.”66
But, as the Ninth Circuit observed in MDY Industries, LLC v.
Blizzard Entertainment Inc., a controversy involving the online
multi-player videogame “World of Warcraft,” there is considerable
evidence from the text and from the legislative history that
Congress did intend to create an additional copyright regime based
on the control over access to digitally distributed works of
authorship.67 The text indicates that the “access” that § 1201(a)
protects goes beyond traditional copyright prerogatives; it
distinguishes “access” from a “right of the copyright owner under
this title.” The legislative history shows that the DMCA was
designed in part specifically to foster a variety of business models
offering the public a diversity of levels of access, for a diversity of
prices. The Ninth Circuit quoted the report of the House
Commerce Committee:
[A]n increasing number of intellectual property
works are being distributed using a “client-server”
model, where the work is effectively “borrowed” by
the user . . . . To operate in this environment,
content providers will need both the technology to
65

Id. at 1197–1201; accord Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g &
Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
66
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1200–01.
67
629 F.3d 928, 947–48 (9th Cir. 2010).
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make new uses possible and the legal framework to
ensure they can protect their work from piracy.68
Thus, the “access” that § 1201(a) protects goes beyond
traditional copyright prerogatives. The difference in scope
becomes apparent if one compares the consequences of protecting
a measure controlling “access to a work” with a measure
controlling “access to a copy of a work.”69 The latter corresponds
to “access” in the traditional copyright sense of the right to
distribute copies of the work; the former is the new right
introduced in the DMCA. In a pay-per-view scheme, viewing the
work at home is not a public performance; circumventing an access
protection to view the film more times than paid for does not
violate a “right of the copyright owner.” Legal protection of the
access measure thus gives the copyright owner control over
consumer activities not reached by traditional copyright rights but
within the scope of the electronic commerce envisioned by
Congress.
c) Exceptions to circumvention of access controls
Given the broad scope of § 1201’s coverage, one might inquire
if concomitantly capacious exceptions temper the new rights. In
fact, § 1201 also sets out a long, disparate (and somewhat
incoherent) list of exceptions to the prohibition on circumvention
of access controls,70 but these are narrowly-drafted and do not
suggest a general limiting principle from which further exceptions
might be derived. Instead, Congress instructed the Librarian of
Congress, in consultation with the Register of Copyrights, to

68

Id. at 947–48 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 23 (1998)).
See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 28 (1998).
70
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)–(j) (2006). The § 1201(f) exception for reverse
engineering permits the circumvention of access controls for the sole purpose of creating
non-infringing interoperable programs. This provision might offer a significant safety
valve, notably because it also permits both development of devices necessary to effect the
permitted reverse engineering, and distribution of the fruits of the permitted reverse
engineering. The case law construing § 1201(f) remains fairly sparse, however. See
Davidson & Assoc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F.Supp. 2d 1164 (E.D. Mo. 2004), aff’d,
422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005) (rejecting application of exception). For a fuller description
of these and other exceptions to § 1201(a), see Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation
for the “Digital Millennium,” 23 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 137, 148–52 (1999).
69
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conduct a rulemaking every three years, both to identify particular
“classes of works” whose users would be “adversely affected by
the prohibition . . . in their ability to make noninfringing uses
under this title,” and to suspend the application of the prohibition
on the act of access control circumvention as to those works until
the next rulemaking period.71 The burden of proving the need for
the exemption falls on the proponent, and a class identified in a
prior rulemaking is not automatically reinstated.72 The Copyright
Office determines whether a need for an exemption continues to be
demonstrated.73 Note that the prohibitions against trafficking in
access circumvention devices still apply.74
A detailed discussion of the excepted classes is beyond the
scope of this review,75 as is an analysis of other potential bases for
exceptions, particularly to accommodate First Amendment
concerns.76 For present purposes it suffices to say that while no
court has yet entertained a First Amendment exception to § 1201,77
the excepted classes designated by the Copyright Office have
expanded over time, ranging from obsolete formats and devices, to
cover certain commentary, criticism and educational uses of
motion pictures, uses of audiovisual works and ebooks for the
visually disabled, and, importantly, cellphones.78 One such
exemption allows owners of cellphones to switch phone service
networks while retaining their hardware.79 The need for this cell
71
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2006). For a fuller discussion, see June M. Besek, AntiCircumvention Laws and Copyright: A Report From the Kernochan Center for Law,
Media and the Arts, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 389, 416–23 (2004).
72
See Robert A. Gorman, Jane C. Ginsburg & R. Anthony Reese, COPYRIGHT: CASES
AND MATERIALS 1106 (8th ed. 2011).
73
Id. at 1106–07.
74
Id. at 1107.
75
For fuller discussions, see id. at 1106–11. The rulemakings are available on the
Copyright Office website at http://www.copyright.gov/1201.
76
See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, The Pros and Cons of Strengthening Intellectual
Property Protection: Technological Protection Measures and Section 1201 of the U.S.
Copyright Act, 16 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 191, 207–09 (2007).
77
See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); 321
Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004);
United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
78
See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems
for Access Control Technologies, 77 Fed. Reg. 65260 (Oct. 26, 2012).
79
See id. at 65264 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
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phone exception arose because of the arguable misuse of the anticircumvention protections to achieve a goal the statute was not
designed to achieve. Proprietors of wireless networks appear to
have been bootstrapping access to their network service to
protection of the technological measure that controls access to the
software, which causes the cellphone to function in connection
with the service.80 The second cellphone exemption covers the
activity colloquially known as “jailbreaking,” or, in the words of
the rulemaking, lists as a class of works “[c]omputer programs that
enable wireless telephone handsets to execute lawfully obtained
software applications, where circumvention is accomplished for
the sole purpose of enabling interoperability of such applications
with computer programs on the telephone handset.”81 Although
the exception is phrased in general terms, it was prompted by a
particular (mis)use of an access control: Apple’s design of the
iPhone to prevent the running of third-party applications that
Apple had not approved.82
Whether the excepted classes in fact forestall misuse of access
controls may depend on their implementation. Because the
exception extends to the act of circumvention, rather than to the
provision of circumvention devices or services, arguably only the
individual cell phone owner would be entitled to circumvent for
the cited purposes. Since most cellphone owners may not be
sufficiently computer-adept, it might follow that the exception is of
little practical application. If, however, the offering of services
specifically targeted to the particular exemption were deemed to
come within the scope of the exemption, or were to benefit from a
judge-made exception for fair circumvention,83 then the excepted
classes might safeguard against misuse of access controls.

80

Id. In the current Rulemaking, however, the “cellphone unlocking” exception
“applies only to mobile phones acquired prior to the effective date of the exemption or
within 90 days thereafter” Id. at 65265.
81
Id. at 65263.
82
See id. at 65264.
83
See Ginsburg, supra note 76, at 207–09; Timothy K. Armstrong, Fair
Circumvention, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2008).
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2. Copyright Management Information
Section 1202 of the DMCA reflects similar Congressional
goals to enhance electronic commerce in works of authorship. It is
designed to encourage the copyright owner to embed important
copyright-related information in digital copies and phonorecords,
including the name of the author and copyright owner and the
terms and conditions for use of the work. Protecting this
“copyright management information” (CMI) against removal or
falsification should achieve the desired reliability and accuracy of
information relevant to proper identification of works and to
electronic (or other) transactions in rights under copyright.
How effectively § 1202 advances this aim is debatable.
Section 1202 prohibits knowingly providing false CMI with the
intent to facilitate or conceal copyright infringement, as well as
furthering the removal or alteration of CMI with reasonable
grounds for knowing it will facilitate or conceal an infringement.84
This double knowledge standard has proved difficult to satisfy.85
Moreover, linking the violation of the copyright management
information provisions to copyright infringement does not
effectively achieve the objective of ensuring the accuracy and
reliability of a key component of copyright management
information—proper identification of the author (as opposed to the
copyright holder). Apart from the § 106A right of attribution with
respect to works of visual art, there is no right under copyright to
be credited as the author of a work. This gap in § 1202’s coverage
disserves the general public interest in knowing who is the author
of the work. Congress recognized the public benefit of authorship
credit, since § 1202(c)’s definition of copyright management
information includes “the name of, and other identifying
information about, the author of a work.”86 Section 1202 does not
84

See, e.g., Gordon v. Nextel Commc’ns, 345 F.3d 922 (6th Cir. 2003); Schiffer
Publ’g, Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, LLC, No. 03-4962, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9996 (E.D.
Pa. May 25, 2005) (illustrating the difficulty of securing relief under § 1202(b)).
85
See, e.g., McClatchey v. Associated Press, No. 3:05-cv-145, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17768 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2007); see also BanxCorp v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 723 F.
Supp. 2d 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Jacobsen v. Katzer, 609 F. Supp. 2d 925 (N.D. Cal.
2009).
86
In addition, § 409(2) states that an application for registration of copyright “shall
include” the name of the author.
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oblige the rights owner to attach copyright management
information to distributions of the work, but if the rights holder
does attach copyright management information, then it would be
appropriate to interpret the statute to require that the information
include the name of the author. Thus understood, § 1202 expresses
a public policy favoring author identification as part of a reliable
system of dissemination (especially electronic distribution) of
copyrighted works, but as the judicial interpretation of § 1202
suggests, Congress may not have drafted this provision in a way
that sufficiently implements either authors’ interests or the more
general interest in ensuring accurate information about a work of
authorship.
II. DEFENSES AND IMMUNITIES: FAIR USE AND § 512—THE
COPYRIGHT “BALANCE” WEIGHTS TOWARD USERS
Some years ago, with the advent of digital copyright, some
copyright scholars (some celebrating, others dreading) anticipated
the radical diminution of the fair use doctrine.87 On the contrary, I
would suggest that the last twenty years have marked its
extraordinary expansion.88 Courts now regularly give wide berth
to “transformative” reworkings of portions of copyrighted works.89
Moreover, where fair use of an entire work was once considered
exceptional, and almost inconceivable if the entire work was used

87

See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Fair Use v. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights
Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 561 (1998)
(arguing transactions costs justification for fair use no longer applies); Raymond Ku,
Consumers and Creative Destruction: Beyond Fair Use as Market Failure, 18 BERKELEY
TECH L. J. 539, 545 (2003) (criticizing reduced transactions costs rationale for
diminishing fair use); Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and
Contract in the “Newtonian World of On-line Commerce,” 12 BERKELEY TECH L. J. 115,
130 (1997) (positing shrinkage of fair use in light of reduction of market failure).
88
For a range of views on recent developments in fair use, see Symposium, Fair Use:
“Incredibly Shrinking” or Extraordinarily Expanding?, 31 COLUM J.L. & ARTS 433
(2008).
89
See generally Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use
Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 603–06 (2008) (observing how over 80%
of circuit court fair use opinions include a—generally dispositive—“transformativeness”
analysis).
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for commercial purposes,90 in the last twenty years, the concept of
“transformative use,” which originally envisioned the creation of
new works that build on their predecessors,91 has extended to a
variety of commercial digital exploitations that do not produce new
copyrightable expression.92
In addition, as digital media increasingly enable end-users to
engage in copyright-implicating acts, enforcement efforts have
shifted from direct infringers to the technological entrepreneurs
who facilitate unauthorized acts of reproduction and
communication to the public; but judicial interpretation of
Congress’ provisions for service provider immunity in § 512(c) of
the Copyright Act has further re-balanced copyright to favor
business models built (without authorization) on third-party
copyrighted content.
A. Fair, “Transformative” Use
1. Transformative purposes
In the context of the first fair use factor (the purpose and
character of the use), Judge Leval’s seminal coinage of
“transformative use”93 (formerly known as “productive use”94)
predates the twenty-year period here reviewed, but the Supreme
Court’s endorsement of the term and of Judge Leval’s analysis
falls within our time frame. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
the Court inquired whether the defendants’ musical parody had

90

See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449–50
(1984).
91
See Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1105 (1990).
92
Moreover, traditional beneficiaries of fair use or other exceptions, seeking to ensure
the transposition, and perhaps enlargement, of their privileges to the digital environment,
have embarked on what one might call “fair use entrepreneurship” (a phrase whose
coinage I credit to my colleague June M. Besek) through drafting of aspirational “best
practices.” See, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF RESEARCH LIBRARIES, CODE OF BEST PRACTICES IN
FAIR USE FOR ACADEMIC AND RESEARCH LIBRARIES (January 2012), available at
http://www.arl.org/bm~doc/code-of-best-practices-fair-use.pdf. See generally, Patricia
Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, RECLAIMING FAIR USE: HOW TO PUT BALANCE BACK INTO
COPYRIGHT (2011).
93
See Leval, supra note 91, at 1111–12.
94
See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 427, 455 n.40; id. at 479–80 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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made a “transformative” use: not one that merely supersedes the
objects of the earlier work by copying it, but that “adds something
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first
with new expression, meaning, or message.”95 While the context
of Campbell suggests that the defendant has “transformed” the
prior work by creating a new work, courts have come to interpret
“something new, with a further purpose” to encompass copying
that does not add “new expression,” so long as the copying gives
the prior work “new meaning.”96 Recent cases evidence a drift
from “transformative work” to “transformative purpose”; in the
latter instance, copying of an entire work, without creating a new
work, may be excused if the court perceives a sufficient public
benefit in the appropriation.
In the initial shift from “transformative work” to
“transformative purpose” the defendant had in fact created an
independent work of authorship, even though that work did not
significantly alter the copied work. Thus, in Bill Graham Archives
v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd.,97 (which did not concern digital
technologies) the Second Circuit held “transformative” reducedsized complete images of posters of the legendary rock band the
Grateful Dead by the publisher of a coffee table book biography of
the group because the book used the images of the posters as
“historical artifacts” to document the Dead’s concerts, rather than
for the posters’ original aesthetic purpose.98 But the documentaryaesthetic distinction has also significantly expanded the application
of the fair use exception to new technological uses that do not yield
new works. The search engine practice of “indexing” has been the
principal digital beneficiary of the “documentary” or “new
95

510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006) (copying of photograph
into visual collage for “an entirely different purpose and meaning” held fair use).
97
448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).
98
Even in more traditional contexts, the distinction in purpose can help ensure that the
copyright in a work does not preclude third parties from producing a work about the
copied work, so long as they do not copy more than needed for the documentary purpose.
See id. at 609–10. By contrast, courts discount the assertions of documentary purpose if
they perceive that the defendant has reproduced the copied author’s “original expression
for its inherent entertainment and aesthetic value.” See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. RDR
Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (Harry Potter Lexicon “not consistently
transformative” because it copied too much.).
96
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purpose” brand of transformativeness.99 But other applications of
the distinction are emerging. For example, the constitution of a
commercial database containing complete copies of copyrighted
works may be fair use if the database does not exploit the works
for their expressive value.100 Google has asserted that its scanning
and retention of millions of copyrighted books is a transformative
fair use because Google’s responses to user queries seeking
bibliographic information or arguably fair use extracts from the
books depend on storing full-text copies in its database.101 Twenty
years ago, I doubt many copyright lawyers (if any) would have
found Google’s unauthorized and commercial mass digitization a
plausible fair use candidate. Today even copyright traditionalists
would acknowledge that notwithstanding its stunning boldness, the
fair use claim is at least conceivable.
2. Transformative markets
The fourth fair use factor (the impact of the use upon the
potential market for the work), is often conflated with the first
factor; courts tend to equate “transformative” works or purposes
with those that do not substitute for the copyright owner’s normal
markets for the work.102 Indeed, the Second Circuit has even
coined the term “transformative market,”103 apparently meaning an
exploitation that falls outside the copyright owner’s zone of
exclusivity. The counterpoint to a “transformative market”
99

See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1174–75 (9th Cir.
2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 942 (9th Cir. 2002).
100
See A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639 (4th Cir. 2009)
(“‘iParadigms’ use of plaintiffs’ works [in a plagiarism detection database] had an
entirely different function and purpose than the original works.”).
101
Defendant Google Inc.’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Its
Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative Summary Adjudication at 27–28,
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2012); cf.
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, No. 11 CV 6351(HB), 2012 WL 4808939, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2012) (“The use to which the works in the HDL were put is
transformative because the copies serve an entirely different purpose than the original
works: the purpose is superior search capabilities rather than actual access to copyrighted
material.”).
102
See, e.g., Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 619 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2009); Perfect
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1146; Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling
Kindersley, Ltd.,. 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).
103
Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 614–15.
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(favoring fair use) is “a traditional license market,” that is, a
“traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed market”104
(disfavoring fair use). Courts inquire into whether the plaintiff is
currently exploiting the market, or whether the market is one that
similarly situated copyright owners would normally exploit. The
latter showing is important in instances where the author has
chosen for artistic or other reasons not to develop a particular
market. For example, in the case of a novelist who declines to
create or authorize a sequel,105 or of a screenwriter-television
producer who refuses to license a trivia quiz book about the
show,106 arguments that unauthorized entrants into those markets
cause the creators no harm because they chose to forgo those
derivative works markets have proven unavailing because courts so
far have recognized both that defendants’ uses occupy traditional
markets, and that the copyright confers the right to control the
work’s artistic as well as its commercial destiny.
The inquiry into “traditional license markets” also endeavors to
avoid the charge of circularity. Arguably, if the use is one that
copyright owners could license, then its unlicensed exploitation
cannot be fair use.107 By focusing on whether license markets in
fact exist, or are in imminent prospect,108 courts seek to follow
factor four’s direction to examine the use’s impact on the
“potential market for the work” (emphasis supplied) without
overstretching the realm of possible licensing opportunities.
Recourse to the “transformative” character of the use may help
courts identify what uses properly fall within that potential. (Put
another, more cynical, way, having determined that a use should
not be ruled infringing, courts may announce that its
“transformativeness” precludes cognizable potential market harm.)

104

Id. at 614 (quoting Am. Geophysical v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 1994)).
See Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F.3d 68
(2d Cir. 2010).
106
See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g, Inc. 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
107
See, e.g., Bell, supra note 87.
108
See e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004, 1016–17 (9th Cir.
2001) (examining market harm from the perspective not only of file-sharing’s impact on
established markets for sales of CDs, but also on the emerging market for licensed
downloads).
105
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3. Other developments
The significance of new licensing markets may be greatest
when the transformative character of the use is weakest,
particularly when the “transformation” might better be seen as a
new form of redistribution of the same content. The photocopying
decisions rendered during our twenty-year period are significant in
this regard not only for their endorsement of new licensing markets
but equally importantly for their recognition that the new
technology at issue had changed the nature of the object of inquiry
into economic harm. Where once the relevant economic unit was
the book or journal issue as a whole, the photocopier’s
disaggregation of the work into separate chapters or articles,109 or
even shorter excerpts,110 shifts the focus to smaller compensable
units.111 This phenomenon is not confined to photocopiers or to
literary works, as the emergence of a market for “ringtones”
(usually twenty to thirty seconds of a recorded musical
composition) attests. As a result, the third factor (amount and
substantiality of the portion taken) may blend with the fourth, as
the “substantiality” of the copied amount may turn on its distinct
exploitability.
As we have seen, however, redistribution of the same content is
no longer fatal to a fair use claim. In addition to entertaining some
digital redistributions’ (very) arguable “transformativeness,” courts
have also credited the defense of implied license.112 Arguably,
anyone who posts a website wants that website to be found on the
Internet; to be found, one’s site has to be “indexed,” that is, copied
and stored in the search engine’s database, as well as partly
reproduced in search reports. Copyright owners who do not wish
to have their sites copied can “opt out” of being crawled by
including an instruction to the search engine’s “robot” not to copy

109

See Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 913.
See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.
1996) (en banc).
111
But see Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, No. 1 (N.D. Ga.
2012) (evaluating impact on books as a whole rather than individual chapters of books in
assessing fair use of portions of books placed on university course “electronic reserves”).
Publisher appears not to have pleaded market harm to individual chapters.
112
See, e.g., Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
110

C04_GINSBURG (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 1992–2012

3/5/2013 3:16 PM

493

the site.113 Otherwise, in this fully automated process (whose
defaults the search engine nonetheless sets), the website will be
included. Failure to withdraw completely from the indexing
process (in the absence of a halfway setting allowing the “bot” to
reproduce some but not all of the content of an open-access
webpage) is construed as acceptance of the search engine’s
terms.114 The more widespread the practice of implied licensing,
the more “fair” it becomes. While the outcome seems reasonable
in the context of search reports, it is more problematic with respect
to news aggregation sites (compiled by the same search engines)
that copy headlines and full sentences from news organizations’
websites. It is also troubling that fair use may be becoming
intertwined with implied license arguments which themselves
presume copyright owner acceptance of search engines’
unilaterally-imposed design choices.
B. ISP immunity and copyright-exploiting business models
Where end-users once merely consumed copyrighted works
brought to them by distribution or transmission intermediaries, the
Internet has given end-users the capacity to copy and communicate
works themselves. Consequently, it has also altered the role of
intermediaries, many of whom now facilitate end-user
communications without themselves actively intervening in the
creation or selection of the content that they transmit. Internet
service providers (ISPs) that allow home computer users to
connect to the Internet and to post and exchange all manner of
potentially copyright-protected materials provide an appealing
target for copyright infringement lawsuits, when the alternative
would often be cumbersome suits against individuals. ISPs
accordingly have, thanks to the DMCA, largely succeeded in
insulating themselves from most copyright liability.115 ISPs now
enjoy liability limitations even in circumstances unanticipated by
Congress in 1998, circumstances which have promoted copyrightdependent, yet largely copyright-immune business models.
113

See, e.g., Googlebot, GOOGLE (June 7, 2012), http://support.google.com/
webmasters/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=182072.
114
See id.
115
See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
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1. The statutory safe harbor regime
Section 512 of the Copyright Act exempts online service and
access providers from liability for damages for copyright
infringement, and significantly reduces the scope of injunctive
relief, if the providers meet the bill’s cumulative factors assessing
the independence of the providers from the infringing content they
transmit, host or link to. Service providers have no general duty to
monitor their sites, nor to seek out evidence of infringing
activity.116 Failure to comply with § 512 does not of itself subject
the service provider to liability for copyright infringement; § 512
offers a safe harbor, but a nonqualifying provider must still be
proved to have infringed, and may still invoke traditional copyright
and other defenses.
A thorough review of the § 512 case law exceeds the scope of
this summary; I will focus on judicial interpretation of the criteria
for limiting the liability of hosts of third-party content residing on
systems or networks at the direction of users (§ 512(c)). Section
512(c) sets forth cumulative prerequisites to a hosting service
provider’s qualification for exemption from direct or vicarious
liability for copyright infringement. First, the host must be a
“service provider.” Section 512’s definition of “service provider”
is exceedingly vague; the term “means a provider of online
services or network access or the operator of facilities therefor.”
“Online services” are not defined, but the case law has generally
interpreted “service provider” broadly, to cover not only Internetspecific businesses, but a variety of traditional businesses’ Internet
operations as well.117
Second, § 512(c) absolves a host service provider from liability
“for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the
direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network
controlled or operated by or for the service provider.” At first
blush, it might appear that § 512 does not suspend liability for
other acts in which the service provider might engage

116

Id. § 512(m).
See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1175
(C.D. Cal. 2002) (assuming defendant qualified as a service provider, but admitting that it
“has found no discussion [in prior case law] of this definition’s limits”).
117
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independently of, or even with respect to, third-party-posted
content. But, as the Ninth Circuit has stressed, § 512 assumes that
users will be able to access content posted to host websites.118
Thus, the websites must be permitted to transmit the stored content
to the requesting user; to limit § 512(c) to the sole act of storage
would effectively nullify the safe harbor.119 To the extent the
storage-plus activity is not closely related to the storage, the
service provider would lose the safe harbor only with respect to the
activities that exceeded the bounds of “‘storage’ and allied
functions”; any excess would not disqualify those activities that
came within those bounds.120
Third, a host provider must “not have actual knowledge that
the material or an activity using the material on the system or
network is infringing”121 and it must not be “aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent”;122 this is
sometimes referred to as the “red flag” standard.123 Once the host
becomes “aware” of infringing activity, it must act “expeditiously
to remove, or disable access to, the material.”124 Most importantly,
in the absence of prior awareness, but upon proper notification by
the copyright owner, the service provider must respond
“expeditiously to remove, or disable access to” the allegedly
infringing material.125 Accordingly, § 512(c)(2) requires that a
service provider, in order to benefit from the reduction in liability,
designate, and provide contact information concerning, an agent to
receive notification of claimed infringements.126 Under § 512, the
qualifying service provider incurs no general burden of

118

See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1033
(9th Cir. 2011).
119
See id.
120
See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2010),
aff’d, 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
121
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
122
Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
123
See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012); Shelter
Capital, 667 F.3d at 1038; Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir.
2007).
124
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2006).
125
Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
126
Id. § 512(c)(2).
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anticipating or preventing infringement; it need only react to
notices of infringement that the copyright holders uncover.
2. Practical implications of the safe harbor regime
In practice, § 512(c)’s notice and take-down system may not
adequately address the hydra-like reappearance of noticed content.
Because other users may promptly re-post content the notified
service provider takes down, the question arises at what point, if
any, the service provider becomes disqualifyingly “aware” that the
contested content is making repeat appearances, so that some
obligation to forestall specific infringements may attach. So far,
the case law interpreting the statutory “red flag” standard suggests
the flag may need to be an immense crimson banner before any
service provider obligation to intervene of its own accord comes
into play.127 General knowledge that the service’s users are
posting infringing content does not suffice to shift the burden of
investigation; indeed, courts have held that if any investigation is
required to ascertain a particular infringement, then the service has
no duty to intervene.128 Rather, as the Second Circuit held in
Viacom v. YouTube, knowledge of specific infringements is
required: the “red flag” waves only if “the provider was
subjectively aware of facts that would have made the specific
infringement ‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable person.”129
Although the point is debatable, it has been held that even repeated
take-down notices identifying the same specific unauthorized
content do not give rise to sufficient awareness.130 It appears from
Viacom and other decisions that if the service provider must of its
own accord remove infringing content, it must know, without
investigation, not only what the particular content is, but where it
is to be found on the website.
Lest this standard seem exceedingly forgiving, the Viacom
court tempered it by interpreting § 512(c) to accommodate
common law principles of “willful blindness,” and thus to attribute
127

See, e.g., Viacom, 676 F.3d at 32; Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1114.
See Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1114.
129
676 F.3d at 31.
130
See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108
(C.D. Cal. 2009).
128
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actual knowledge to the person or entity who consciously avoids
confirming the existence of blatant infringements.131 While the
Court of Appeals acknowledged that willful blindness must be
assessed in light of the statute’s rejection of an affirmative duty to
monitor one’s site, it held that the district court should have
considered whether YouTube was willfully blind to infringements
of which it should have known, and directed the district court to
address this issue on remand.132
Even allowing for some enlargement of the “red flag” standard
through the doctrine of willful blindness, the threshold of
awareness remains sufficiently high to foster new business models
built on third-party copyrights from which the entrepreneur
maintains the statutory degree of attenuation. While Congress in §
512(c) clearly intended to encourage new Internet intermediary
businesses by removing the disincentive of prospective liability, it
also sought to facilitate copyright enforcement through expeditious
and effective take-down of infringing content. Perhaps the text
Congress enacted resists a construction that takes account of the
intervening technological developments that have set the original
balance askew, or perhaps judicial interpretation has emphasized
solicitude for copyright intermediaries at the cost of copyright
owners. Either way, judicial application of § 512(c), together with
the expansion of technological fair use and the sometimes cramped
interpretation of the § 106 exclusive rights, further illustrates the
evolution of copyright doctrine toward what, just before our
twenty-year period, Ray Patterson and Stanley Lindberg
presciently dubbed “a law of users’ rights.”133
III. CONCLUSION: A DIFFERENT DEVELOPMENT . . .
With creators in mind, I turn to the promised less-obvious
development in the last twenty years of U.S. copyright. My
candidate for the most important copyright development is Harry
Potter. J.K. Rowling is, after all, the poster child for copyright,
131

See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 35.
Id.
133
L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW
OF USERS’ RIGHTS (1991).
132
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having gone from public assistance to riches surpassing the Queen
of England, all on the fruits of her intellectual labor.134 Her
success reassures us of the centrality of individual creativity in the
copyright scheme. She has, moreover, managed to retain a
remarkable degree of artistic and financial control over her works,
from film rights to ebooks. Harry Potter is also an international
phenomenon, widely translated, distributed—and infringed,
whether by “Tanya Grotter,” a Russian emulation condemned by
the Dutch courts, or “Harry Potter in Calcutta” ruled an
infringement in India.135
Harry Potter also affords a useful vehicle to examine
limitations on copyright, both de jure, in the form of the fair use
doctrine, and de facto, via the Internet. The Harry Potter Lexicon
sparked an interesting debate about the doctrinal differences
between the non-commercial online version, which J.K. Rowling
had praised, and the commercially published book, which she
sought to have enjoined.136 In the transition from web format to
print, the Lexicon lost the crossreferential and interactive features
that had enhanced its claim to fair use. In print, as Rowling’s
lawyer put it, the author and publisher “took too much and did too
little.”137
It had become a cut-and-paste job lacking
“transformative” commentary or analysis, and potentially
competed with Rowling’s own revision of her works into reference
volumes. By contrast, Rowling does not pursue the myriad
acolytes who post on the web vast numbers of “fan fiction”
variants
on
the
Harry
Potter
books.
The
“HarryPotterFanfiction.com” site alone boasts almost 36,000

134

See The Wealthiest Women, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Apr. 29, 2012 at 74
(estimating Rowling’s wealth at £560 million and the Queen’s at £310 million); see also
Robert P. Merges, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 133–35 (2011).
135
See Tim Wu, Harry Potter and the International Order of Copyright, SLATE
MAGAZINE (June 27, 2003, 12:42 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
jurisprudence/2003/06/harry_potter_and_ the_international_order_of_copyright.html.
136
See Warner Bros. Entm’t v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 517, 521 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
137
See Elyssa A.L. Spitzer, Lawyer Curses Potter Copyright Crimes, HARVARD
CRIMSON, Nov. 7, 2008, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2008/11/7/lawyer-cursespotter-copyright-crimes-the.
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authors of over 78,000 Harry Potter stories.138 Were these (or
some of them) commercialized as sequels, an infringement action
might well follow; as webposts, they constitute one of the most
significant examples of what my colleague Tim Wu has called
“tolerated use,” that is, uses which may be pervasive yet pass
under the radar of copyright enforcement, in part because their
financial or artistic impact may be trivial, and in part because
authors do not wish to antagonize their fan base.139
The Harry Potter books also provide a tantalizing glimpse of
author-managed exploitation. Rowling kept her ebook rights, and
released the Potter books as ebooks only in March 2012.140 They
are compatible with all ebook readers, but available only from
Rowling’s own “Pottermore” website. Or, available illegitimately,
since within less than nine days the books could be obtained from
the Pirate Bay and other unlawful sources.141
Of course, when it comes to controlling one’s literary or artistic
property, not everyone is J.K. Rowling, but it bears emphasis that
less than twenty years ago, J.K. Rowling was “everyone,”
struggling to write and to make a living. And almost twenty years
later, the digital tools are available for “everyone” directly to reach
her audience, and even get paid for her work (assuming that those
same tools have not made copyright unenforceable).142
That hopeful forecast notwithstanding, I must also sound a
somber note. In the last twenty years we have seen a progressive
denigration of authors, from the Romantic Author-bashing of the

138

HARRYPOTTERFANFICTION.COM, http://harrypotterfanfiction.com (last visited Sept.
5, 2012).
139
See Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM J. L. & ARTS 617, 619 (2008).
140
See Harry Potter’s New Digital Adventure Begins, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2012, at
C3.
141
See Harry Potter ebooks, PIRATE BAY, http://thepiratebay.se/torrent/7161723/Harry_
Potter_ ebooks_ %28Pottermore%29 (ebook uploaded Apr. 5, 2012).
142
For example, “fantasy fiction” author Terry Goodkind recently (and so far very
successfully) began self-publishing digital books. See Tracking Amazon: Terry
Goodkind’s Self-Published Novel Skyrockets, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY (July 3, 2012),
http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/publisher-news/article
/52860-tracking-amazon-terry-goodkind-s-self-published-novel-skyrockets.html.
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1990s143 to the new romances144 of “crowdsourcing,” and of
authorial altruism (unremunerated authors who just can’t restrain
themselves from being creative). More recently, with the advent of
mass digitization, another attack on authors arrives, this time for
complicating transactions: if we didn’t have so many pesky authors
who may be hard to find (or who if found, claim ownership of
residual digital rights) then we could reduce the friction that
discourages putting our entire cultural heritage online for the
broader public good—or at least for the good of the entrepreneurs
who would profit from new digital exploitations.145
But this is not a new complaint. In 1933 Australian novelist
Miles Franklin imagined a conversation among movie moguls:
[T]hey were generally agreed that the total
elimination of the author would be a tremendous
advance. . . .
“Authors,” said [the] gentleman, “are the bummest
lot of cranks I have ever been up against. Why the
heck they aren’t content to beat it once they get a
price for their stuff, gets my goat.”
....
There was ready agreement that authors were a
wanton tax on any industry, whether publishing,
drama or pictures.146

143
See, e.g., THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi
eds., 1994). The death knell of individual genius continues to sound, as contemporary
critics contend that the true source of creativity is the author’s surrounding community, to
which authors owe a debt, whose disregard violates the human rights of the community.
See also, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity
Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31 (2011) (contending authors irrationally overvalue their
work, distorting IP policy).
144
See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92
CAL. L REV. 1331, 1332 (2004) (whose title inspired the identification of similar
“romances”).
145
See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Google and the Proper Antitrust
Scrutiny of Orphan Books, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 411 (2009); see also Authors
Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
146
MILES FRANKLIN, BRING THE MONKEY 38–39 (1933).
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In the future, will we continue to perceive authors as a “wanton
tax,” or as essential contributors to the Constitutional aspiration for
“the progress of Science”?147

147

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

